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Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
Rui Bertrand Romão
Conservation plays a crucial and multi-levelled role in the
TTP.1 We can forthwith disclose it in the complete title of the
treatise:
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Continens Dissertationes aliquot, Qui-
bus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum salva Pietate, &
Reipublicae Pace posse concedi: sed eandem nisi cum Pace Reipubli-
cae, ipsaque Pietate tolli non posse.2
Safeguarding at the same time piety and the peace of the Re-
public shows itself as a double aim that the author wants to present
as not only compatible with the freedom to philosophize but also
inseparable from it.
If the first part of the subtitle already contains as an implicit
feature of it the reference to the conciliation of the freedom to phi-
losophize with the preservation of piety and peace, the second part
goes a step further. It indeed reinforces the need to preserve piety
and peace as linked to the aforesaid freedom when it declares that
without the latter they would sink into nothingness. Philosophi-
cal liberty becomes then a sine qua non condition of the existence
1Used abbreviation for the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, quoted in Latin
according to the edition by Gebhardt published in volume 3 of his edition of
Spinoza’s Opera (Spinoza, Opera, hrsg. von Carl Gebhardt, Band 3, Heidel-
berg, Carl Winter, 1925, reprinted in 1972). Further references to this edition
of the TTP will appear in the footnotes as G, followed by the page number.
2 In the most recent English translation of the treatise, by Silverthone
and Israel, the title is thus rendered: “Theological-Political Treatise / Con-
taining several discourses wich demonstrate that freedom to philosophize may
not only be allowed without danger to piety and the stability of the republic
but cannot be refused without destroying the peace of the republic and piety
itself” [Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, edited by J. Israel,
translated by M. Silverthone and J. Israel, Cambridge and New York, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007, p. 1]. From now on I shall use this translation,
referred to as SI, followed by the page number, in the quotations of this article
with only slight alterations from my own.
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and maintenance both of pious behaviour in men belonging to a
community and of a peaceful republic.
A main objection against this view would be that the complete
title of the TTP does not expressly mention conservation. More-
over, even if it did, that would not mean that its function there
rises above the status of a merely instrumental function.
Responding to this argument, I claim that the Author in the
subtitle clearly declares that according to him the tie that bonds
freedom to philosophize to piety and to peace is such that these
two cannot be preserved without the former. Thus, one cannot
abstract the operational character of conservation from what it is
applied to, and the survival of a pious behaviour and of public
peace depends upon that kind of freedom.
The epigraph that immediately follows the title, taken from
an Epistle of St. John the Apostle, corroborates the idea of con-
servation through the repeated use of the verb manere, laying
stress on the intertwining of the divine and the human: “Per hoc
cognoscimus quod in Deo manemus, & Deus manet in nobis, quod
de Spiritu suo dedit nobis”.3 Spinoza will quote again the very
same verse in the chapter XIV of the TTP. The context of that
quotation reveals his understanding of it and gives us a hint on why
he adopted it as an epigraph for the whole work. The framework
is that of a harsh attack on sectarianism, and there he explic-
itly links faith to obedience and claims that the gift of the divine
Spirit to men is charity. In a way, the character of permanence
transmitted by the dwelling of men in God and the maintenance
of God in men thought in relation to obedience and charity, both
having social and political connotations, bespeaks the idea of con-
servation as necessary to the interplaying of the theological and
political dimensions.
3“Hereby know we that we dwell in him, and he in us, because he hath
given us of his Spirit”, 1 John, 4: 13, KJV. The corroboration seems even
more obvious in translation if we use the version of the verse by Silverthone
and Israel, who literally render manere by “remain”: “By this we know that we
remain in God, and God remain in us, because he has given us of his spirit”,
SI 1].
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Reading the notion of conservation into the title and the epi-
graph of the TTP would amount to no more than a farfetched
overinterpretation of Spinoza’s words if the text itself of the work
did not reveal it as an essential element of the project it puts
forward.
Usually scholars and commentators while stressing Spinoza’s
defence of the freedom to philosophize in its relation with the
pair theological and political tend to underestimate, if not to com-
pletely forget, his attentive highlighting of the conservation mo-
tive he develops within the context of that very same defence.
One of the factors that mostly substantiate this omission is the
circumstance that many among the fiercest attackers of the TTP
belonged to what nowadays most historians classify as conserva-
tive circles. The reception of Spinoza’s philosophy in general and
in particular of the TTP (as well as its later fortune) also bolsters
the view that undervalues the presence of the themes related to
conservation in the TTP, and it accentuates the most modern ele-
ments of that philosophy and specially those in clear cleavage with
the mainstream thought of its epoch.
We cannot deny the immense influence that work had in the
development of secular thinking, in the formation of modern demo-
cratic Republicanism, in the origins of individualistic liberalism,
in the renewal of hermeneutics of the Bible and in the expansion
of freedom of thought. Jonathan Israel in his monumental work
on the Enlightenment has even maintained with a remarkable dis-
play of erudition and evidence that Spinoza was indeed the central
figure in the early development of the Enlightenment movement,
representing its most extremist current, because of his materialis-
tic, religiously sceptical and liberal minded philosophy. 4
4See Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Mak-
ing of Modernity 1650-1750 , Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press,
2001, passim]. Even now, there is no consensus among scholars either about
Israel’s classification of the currents of Enlightenment or about his charac-
terization of Spinoza’s role in its development. It has recently been written
that Israel took the expression “radical Enlightenment” from Margaret Jacob
[Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and
Republicans, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981], giving it a diﬀerent mean-
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However, even if we accept as decisive both Spinoza’s radical-
ism and its influence on the course of modern political thought
in general as well as its impact on the origins of liberalism, we
should take enormous care in avoiding contaminating our study of
his texts by what we know of the heritage they plausibly produced
and also in averting to project backwards on his political philos-
ophy features of a current of thought that only much later was
coherently constituted as such. We also should not neglect con-
notations of theses, themes and motives we may read in Spinoza’s
work for the reason that they do not seem to concur with his char-
acterization as one of the founding fathers of modern liberalism.
The study of the notion of conservation in Spinoza has suf-
fered from the perhaps excessive polarization of the analysis of his
work from a political point of view around the nucleus formed by
the central ideas related to his being a harbinger of the modern
democratic republicanism.
The late French scholar François Zourabichvili, in a study
published in 2002, called Le conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza.
Enfance et royauté, greatly repaired the omission by interpreting
Spinoza’s philosophy from a perspective precisely focusing conser-
vation. For him:
“Spinoza’s philosophy places the conservation of the form at the cen-
tre of its practical concerns. Notwithstanding this there never was
ing [cf. Tristan Dagron, Toland et Spinoza. L￿Invention du néo-spinozisme,
Paris, Vrin, 2009, p.191]. If that seems to be true if we only consider titles, as
an expression “radical Enlightenment” was not unheard-of at least since the
early 20th Century. After all, many people in diﬀerent ages have considered
Enlightenment as itself a radical movement. An explicit mention of the link-
ing of Spinoza to radical Enlightement appears in Strauss’s book published
in 1930 and translated into English 35 years later: “It is for this reason and
only for this reason That Spinoza’s work is of fundamental importance. The
context to which it belongs is the critique of Revelation as attempted by the
radical Enlightenment”, Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Chicago
& London, The Chicago University Press, 1965, p. 35 [1st German edition:
1930].
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a philosophy like his so much concerned with rupture: it proposes a
new life to the individual and new institutions to the community”. 5
The aim of this article is much narrower than that of Zoura-
bichvili’s book, having, unlike it, no ambitions to provide a global
and somewhat systematic interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy.
Neither it aspires to attribute to the Dutch philosopher any kind of
conservatism, including the paradoxical sort Zourabichvili speaks
of. My purpose in this article is merely to pinpoint the signifi-
cance of the notion of conservation in the TTP and exclusively in
the TTP. My intentions depart from those of Zourabichvili in still
another aspect for I do not centre my attention in “conservation
of form”.
One of the reasons why I refrain from ascribing to any aspect of
Spinoza’s thought some sort of conservatism, albeit a paradoxical
one, rests on the imprecision, vagueness and anachronistic charac-
ter of the designation when applied to a 17th Century philosopher6.
Apart from this, the TTP clearly sustains positions and the-
ories that would practically seem an understatement to classify
them as merely controversial for its contemporaries. To name but
a few of them, the apology of freedom of thought, the defence
of religious tolerance, the conception of piety as obedience, the
necessity of complete separation between philosophy and theol-
ogy, a new and audacious biblical exegesis and the focusing of the
political utility of religion are elements that compose a rational-
istic philosophical system of a clear-cut modernity. Nevertheless,
5François Zourabichvili, Le conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza. Enfance
et royauté, Paris, PUF, 2002, p.31. The translation is mine, keeping in italics
the words in the original that way highlighted.
6The very same motive impels me to avoid designating Spinoza as a real
liberal thinker. However, I cannot but admit that there are ample grounds
for envisaging him as a forerunner of liberalism while I would not dream of
inscribing him or his works as precursors, alongside, for instance, Michel de
Montaigne, Richard Hooker or Hume, of what would turn to become modern
conservatism. In spite of this, his materialism can easily be reconciled with
modern political conservatism, as three of the foremost original philosophers
representing this current in the 20th Century well illustrate: George Santayana,
Michael Oakeshott and Anthony Quinton.
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recognizing the innovative overtones and the anti-traditionalistic
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy should not lead us either to inter-
pret it as entirely revolutionary or to undervalue, if not to ignore,
the elements that integrate it presenting some sort of continuity
with coeval traditions of some import. Neither should we pass
over themes and positions that apparently could possibly contra-
dict the appreciation of its radicalism or even simply that tend
not to corroborate what is now becoming the mainstream char-
acterization of Spinozism. Thus I shall here freely use sensu lato
the opposed terms conservation and change, associating them with
others somehow related to the notions they represent. Unlike that
of Zourabichvili’s, my point of view privileges the priority of con-
servation over change.
As, for instance, scholars like Israel and Nadler have with
minuteness demonstrated, for Spinoza’s contemporaries the anony-
mously published TTP stood out among the writings then pub-
lished as particularly seditious and revolutionary.
At least, one passage in it, belonging to the chapter VII,
apparently shows that its author manifestly admitted endorsing
innovation:
“Though we admit this procedure does not suﬃce to achieve certainty
about everything in the biblical books, this is not due to any defect
in it but to the circumstance that the path it shows to be the true
and right one was never cultivated, or even ventured on, by men,
so that owing to the passage of time, it became arduous and almost
impassable, as is eminently clear from the diﬃculties that I have
pointed out”. 7
When referring to his method of interpretation of Scripture as
the true and right way of gaining access to the contents of the
Bible never before conceived, Spinoza presents his work as a self-
conscious product of an original thinking. He here seems proud
7SI 111; G 112: “ [. . . ] & quamvis concedamus, eandem non suﬃcere ad
omnia, quae in Bibliis occurrunt, certo investigandum, id tamen non ex ipsius
defectu oritur, sed ex eo, quod via, quam veram & rectam esse docet, nunquam
fuerit culta, nec ab hominibus trita, adeoque successu temporis admodum
ardua et fere invia fere fit, ut ex ipsis diﬃcultatibus, quas retuli, clarissime
constare puto”.
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of authoring a hermeneutical method unheard-of and, at least,
purportedly innovative. But intellectual innovation and love of
novelty for its own sake are distinct things that may or may not
converge. When one claims his novel method of interpretation
is the true and right one, one is not contending it should be ad-
hered to for its very newness but instead for the reasons he thinks
demonstrate it as right and true. If such a claim could possibly be
denounced as revealing arrogance or self-conceit, it would however
be wrong to envisage it as a sign of neophilia. The general purpose
of finding a way that renders the truth of the Sacred Books more
easily accessible through the application of rational means and the
natural light of human reason was not itself an entirely new project
one cannot find earlier than in the 17th Century. Some projects
of Natural Theology of the late Middle Age or of the Renaissance
period, such as the one due to Ramon Sbiuda in the early 15th
Century, for instance, clearly share that purpose with Spinoza.
Moreover, we could say that according to his point of view his
new method serves both to access the understanding of what is
not new and precisely to obviate dangerous innovations causing
conflicts, thus for him irreconcilable with concord, harmony and
charity, in a word, with what he sees as the biblical message.
I also have here to stress that “On the Interpretation of Scrip-
ture” stands out as a chapter of the TTP where Spinoza more
clearly than elsewhere shows respect for tradition as such8 and
concern with the maintenance of peace and concord among men,
expressly accusing the hypocrisy of fanatics and sectarians that
gainsay those values and contribute for the victory of war and dis-
cord. He also incontrovertibly repudiates those exegeses that put
into the Sacred writings what is not there:
“For, as we have already shown, we are not permitted to adjust the
meaning of Scripture to the dictates of our reason or our preconceived
opinions; all explanation of the Bible must be sought from the Bible
alone”.9
8See, for instance, SI 106; G 106.
9SI 101; G 101: “Nam, ut jam ostendimus, nobis non licet ad dictamina
nostrae rationis, et ad nostras praeconceptas opiniones mentem Scripturae
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His adversaries, of course, could have accused him of falling
into the very same mistake he denounced in others.
The mere circumstance that Spinoza’s proclaimed respect for
Biblical tradition as such (grounded on the quite extended and
profound knowledge he shows of it) contrasts with his distorted
version of sacred history does not authorize, for itself, the dis-
claiming of Spinoza’s sincerity and the refutation of the merits of
his method. One should perhaps isolate his hermeneutics from
the uses he gives it and consider that the unorthodox views he
substantiates with it could possibly derive from an authentic at-
tachment to tradition, independently of the deviating and undeni-
able anti-traditionalistic outcomes that result from its application.
The fact is that Spinoza’s hermeneutics apparently are consonant
with the purpose of reconstructing by reason the original truth of
Scripture, formulating it with clarity and not willingly misrepre-
senting it for sectarian motives (even if he indeed misrepresents
it). His intent seems to be demonstrating that sectarian readings
of the Bible resulting in fanatical beliefs that authorize the most
conflictive and bellicose behaviour are groundless. Spinoza is not
alone here for he shares this purpose with some programmes of
apologetics and projects of natural theology of traditional config-
uration. Nonetheless it is undeniable that Spinoza goes against
tradition in his severe critique of revealed religion. One could say,
using passages from a writing of Leo Strauss, that Spinoza could,
in alternative to more current interpretations, be read as not really
a revolutionary thinker but as “the heir of the modern revolt and
the medieval tradition as well”10, for being “the first great thinker
who attempted a synthesis of pre-modern (classical–medieval) and
of modern philosophy”11.
In another of his main writings on Spinoza, the celebrated es-
say “How to Study Spinoza￿s "Theologico-Political Treatise” , first
published in the Proceedings of the American Academy for Jew-
torquere, sed tota Bibliorum cognitio ab iisdem solis est petenda”. Cf, e.g., G
156; SI 160.
10Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique . . . , p.15.
11Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique . . . , pp.15-16.
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ish Research, Vol. 17 (1947-1948), and four years later collected
in a book, Leo Strauss put forward the hypothesis that this text
intentionally had several layers of meaning that could be read by
groups of readers diﬀerently equipped to penetrate into it, thus
turning it into a sort of exoteric writing in part destined to an es-
oteric kind of interpretation12. While recognizing the brilliance of
Strauss’s arguments in favour o his hypothesis, we have some diﬃ-
culty in considering it thoroughly convincing13. Thus, we prefer to
envisage the TTP as not willingly insincere and try to understand
some contradictions as well as ambiguous or enigmatic passages of
it as due to causes each of which has to be analyzed within its pre-
cise context. We should perhaps take into account that it would
be excessive to read the TTP as a systematic work comparable
to the Ethics, or to interpret it in the light of Spinoza’ s master-
piece. Some ambiguities may be dictated by rhetorical reasons.
As Steven Nadler, after discussing Strauss’s theory, says about
Spinoza’s “relatively gentle treatment of the Christian Gospels”14,
he could be “working with a rhetorical strategy geared toward
drawing in his audience, and thus does not always mean exactly
what he says or say everything that he thinks”15.
Be it as it may, the endorsement of neophilia does not ensue
from Spinoza’s attacks on crucial aspects of religious Jewish and
Christian tradition. If such would be his intent most likely he
would really behave according to his motto “Caute”, being more
cautious than audacious and trying to hide his novelties under the
cover of less challenging and provocative statements. In truth,
notwithstanding its originality and its many innovative traits the
12Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, Chicago & London, The
Chicago University Press, 1988, pp.142-201 [1st ed.: 1952].
13See, as an example of an excellent analysis of this straussian reading,
Diogo Pires Aurélio, “Introdução”, in Baruch de Espinosa, Tratado Teológico-
Político, tradução, introdução e notas de Diogo Pires Aurélio, 3ª ed., Lisboa,
Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2004, pp.40-44.
14Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell. Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise and the
Birth of the Secular Age, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press,
2011, p. 172.
15Ibidem.
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TTP seemingly reveals mistrust for the acceptance of what is new
for the sake of newness. We may even find in it passages that
suggest some sort of misoneism.
Spinoza makes a point of criticizing readings of Scripture that
introduce religious innovations, using the sacred writings for war-
ring and politically destabilising purposes. Accordingly, he insists
on presenting his method as a sort of therapeutics against such ex-
egetical innovations, explicitly associating the devising of novelties
in religion to the instigation of quarrelsome controversies and to
“the promotion of conflict and dissemination of furious hatred”16:
“If people truly believed in their hearts what they say with their
lips about Scripture, they would follow a completely diﬀerent way
of life. There would be fewer diﬀerences of opinion occupying their
minds, fewer bitter controversies between them, and less blind and
reckless ambition to distort our interpretation of the Bible and devise
novelties in religion. On the contrary, they would not dare to accept
anything as biblical teaching which they had not derived from it in
the clearest possible way”.17
We thus see that Spinoza associates the devising of novelties
and the willingness to distort the interpretation of Scripture with
the very defects he denounces in the TTP as contrary to the main-
tenance of the peace of the republic and to the observance of piety,
of which the safeguarding, according to him, depends upon the de-
fence of the freedom to philosophize.
His method, in conformity with a practice of piety properly
understood and grounded on solid criteria of exegesis, aims at
transparency, which for him is related to reason and nature and
opposed to the opinions, points of view and attitudes maintained
by his adversaries.
16SI 98; G 97: “[. . . ]disseminandis discordiis inter homines, et odio infen-
sissimo”.
17SI 97; G 97: “Quod si homines id, quod verbis de Scriptura testantur, ex
vero animo dicerent, tum aliam prorsus vivendi rationem haberent, neque tot
discordiae eorum mentes agitarent, neque tot odiis certarent, nec tam caeca
et temeraria cupiditate interpretandi Scripturam, novaque in Religione excog-
itandi tenerentur : Sed contra nihil tanquam Scripturae doctrinam amplecti
auderent, quod ab ipsa quam clarissime non edocerentur” [italics added].
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At the end of the crucial chapter XIV of the TTP, where he
particularly addresses the issue of the separation of philosophy
from faith following the chapter XIII devoted to show the iden-
tification of piety with obedience as the main aim of the teach-
ings of Scripture, Spinoza defends himself from the accusation of
neophilia:
“Finally since the things we have demonstrated here are the cardinal
points proposed to make in this treatise, we desire, before going any
further, to make an earnest request of my readers, to read these two
chapters with some attention and take the trouble to reflect on them
again and again, and to understand that we have not written them
simply to introduce novelties, but to correct abuses that we hope on
day to see corrected”. 18
As here, in a place of utmost importance in the TTP, the con-
clusion of a pair of chapters where he defends two main points
summed up in the subtitle of the treatise, Spinoza clearly shows
himself in a defensive attitude, precisely drawing attention to the
novelty issue, he plausibly addresses readers that would use the tag
of “novelty” applying it to ideas they disapprove of as a disparag-
ing means of justifying their bigotry and their refusal to reflect
upon the arguments put forward by the author.
Faith, thus conceived, somehow associated with conservation
is fully in accordance with freedom to philosophize and disavowed
by the fomentation of strife:
“Faith therefore allows every person the greatest liberty to philoso-
phize, so that they may think whatever they wish about any question
whatever without doing wrong. It only condemns as heretics and
schismatics those who put forward beliefs for the purpose of promot-
ing disobedience, hatred, conflict and anger. On the other hand, faith
regards as faithful only those who promote justice and charity as far
as their reason and abilities allow”. 19
18SI 185; G 180: “Denique, quoniam haec, quae hic ostendimus, praecipua
sunt, quae in hoc tractatu intendo, volo, antequam ulterius pergam, lectorem
enixissime rogare, ut haec duo Capita attentius legere, et iterum, atque iterum
perpendere dignetur; et sibi persuasum habeat, nos non eo scripsisse animo, ut
nova introduceremus, sed ut depravata corrigeremus, quae tandem aliquando
correcta videre speramus” [italics added].
19SI 184-185; G 179-180: “Fides igitur summam unicuique libertatem ad
philosophandum concedit, ut quicquid velit, de rebus quibuscunque sine scelere
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According to this viewpoint, the instigation of conflict denotes
heresy and the promotion of charity faith. The only limit put
by faith to the freedom of thought will then consist of seditious
opinions inciting rebellion and tumultuous actions. However, the
liberty to philosophize does not entirely coincide with freedom of
thought, for philosophizing seems to be somehow self-limiting to
Spinoza. Even if they proclaim themselves supporters of tradition
and defenders of religion, those whose divulged opinions entail dis-
ruption of the political body and of society and contribute to the
disintegration of civil harmony belong to the camp of innovators.
By contrast whoever will sustain methods and theoretical hypothe-
ses defending what tradition presents as defensible and fostering
the adherence to religious precepts of political consequence stands
out as a preserver of order.
One can however ask if the misoneism shown in these passages
(among many others) of the TTP only reveals a merely strate-
gic function. Should we read it as ironic? In spite of what some
commentators have said on the behalf of either of these two solu-
tions (or of both at the same time), an attentive rereading of the
TTP does not allow me to be conclusive as to the question. Yet I
feel inclined to admit that the signs of misoneism Spinoza places
throughout the treatise make sense if interpreted as sincerely af-
firmed, being consistent with his practice of biblical hermeneutics
and with his naturalism. Spinoza’s aversion to newness and to
innovations not rationally and religiously grounded on solid foun-
dations fits perfectly to a system that asserts the order of nature
as fixed and immutable. We could even consider in the extremely
controversial exposition about miracles in chapter VI20 aspects of
sentire possit & eos tantum, tanquam haereticos, & schismaticos damnat, qui
opiniones docent, ad contumaciam, odia, contentiones, & iram suadendum: &
eos contra fideles tantum habet, qui Justitiam & Charitatem, pro viribus suae
rationis, & facultatibus, suadent” [italics added].
20It must be said that far from being completely original it takes roots on a
relatively traditional kind of explanation of some miracles resorting to the fig-
ure of imagination used by Christian authors like Pomponazzi and Montaigne.
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a “naturalistic misoneism” relying on the rejection of innovation
as one of the main causes of dissention.
“All this evidently proves that nature maintains a fixed and im-
mutable order, that God has been the same in all ages known and
unknown to us, and that the laws of nature are so perfect and so
fruitful that nothing can be added to or detracted from them, and
miracles only seem to be new owing to men’s ignorance. This, then
is what is explicitly taught in Scripture; nowhere does it teach us
that anything happens in nature that contradicts nature’s laws or
cannot follow from them [. . . ] It follows, further, and with the ut-
most clarity, that miracles were natural events and therefore must
be explained so as not to seem new (to use Solomon’s word) or in
conflict with nature, but as close to natural realities as possible; and
I have given some rules derived from Scripture alone in order that
anyone should be capable of doing this fairly easily”. 21
The circumstance that Spinoza tries to explain the reception
of novelties in the light of a psychology of error that he integrates
into his system applying its findings to his explanation miracles
proves that the specific problems raised by the perception of what
is unprecedented and new also plays a relevant role within his phi-
losophy. According to him, men are more concerned with confirm-
ing their preconceived opinions than with observing and describing
facts as they sense them. Such a concern distorts their perception
of events and consequently their understanding and narration of
them:
“It happens very rarely that men report something straightforwardly,
just as it occurred, without intruding any judgment of their own into
the telling. In fact, when people see or hear something new, they will,
21SI 95-96; G 95-96: “[. . . ] quae omnia clarissime docent, naturam fixum
atque immutabilem ordinem servare, Deum omnibus saeculis nobis notis et ig-
notis eundem fuisse, legesque naturae adeo perfectas et fertiles esse, ut iis nihil
addi neque detrahi possit, et denique miracula, non nisi propter hominum ig-
norantiam, ut aliquid novi, videri. Haec igitur in Scriptura expresse docentur,
at nullibi, quod in natura aliquid contingat, quod ipsius legibus repugnet, aut
quod ex iis nequeat sequi, adeoque neque etiam Scripturae aﬃngendum. [. . . ]
Ex quibus porro evidentissime sequitur, miracula res naturales fuisse, atque
adeo eadem ita explicanda, ut neque nova (ut Salomonis verbo utar) neque
naturae repugnantia videantur, sed, si fieri potuit, ad res naturales maxime
accedentia, quod ut facilius ab unoquoque possit fieri, quasdam regulas ex sola
Scriptura petitas tradidi [italics added].
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unless very much on their guard against their own preconceived opin-
ions, usually be so biased by these that they will perceive something
quite diﬀerent from what they actually saw or heard had happened,
especially if the event is beyond the understanding of the reporter or
his audience, and most of all if it is in his interest that it should have
happened in a certain way”.22
Such a reflection on men’s relation with newness and on the
severe limitations imposed by prejudices, personal interest on the
operation of the senses and on understanding shows how people
in general, for Spinoza, do not adequately use their judgment and
tend to put its power under the sway of passions. Hence, their
lack of judgment entails an impious behaviour and no less impious
results, their sectarian motivations and feelings being often masked
under an apparent religious fervour.
The author of a work such as the TTP, which explicitly strug-
gles against the factors identified as the ones leading to the total
dissolution of the social and political body, searching for prophy-
lactic or therapeutic means capable of preventing or avoiding the
fratricide internecine caused by sectarianism using religious pre-
texts, could diﬃcultly abstain from subscribing some sort of mis-
oneism, albeit a naturalistic one, somehow associated with the no-
tion of conservation, and integrating it into his theological-political
philosophy.
For Spinoza, the subordination of politics to religion does not
safeguard public safety and stability. Contrariwise, public institu-
tions protecting freedom of thought function as a way of opposing
the interference of sectarianism and fanaticism in politics through
novelties introduced for their sake. The apology for obedience as
piety turns conservation into the link connecting religion to pol-
itics. Hence Spinoza’s necessity of defending stability and firmly
22SI 92; G 91-92: “Raro admodum fit, ut homines rem aliquam, ut gesta
est, ita simpliciter narrent, ut nihil sui judicii narrationi immisceant. Imo,
cum aliquid novi vident aut audiunt, nisi maxime a suis praeconceptis opin-
ionibus caveant, iis plerumque ita praeoccupabantur, ut plane aliud, quam
quod vident, aut contigisse audiunt, percipiant, praesertim si res acta captum
narrantis, aut audientis superat, et maxime si ad ejus rem referat, ut ipsa certo
modo contingat”.
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repelling rebellion as well as religious and political innovations
introduced as such.
The notion of conservation pervades Spinoza’s views on con-
tractualism as exposed in the TTP. We can also see its presence
in, inter alia, his conception of the preservation of the Republic
as “highest good”23, the way he links the keeping of power by
sovereigns to the search for that “highest good” through a mod-
erate and rational conduct24 (for the intemperate use of violence
entails self-destruction) and his description and condemnation of
the crimen laesae majestatis25.
In a way, chapters XVII and XVIII of the TTP culminate
an exposition that highlights conservation, namely when Spinoza,
using examples both of Scripture and of classical history, examines
how a State should be maintained avoiding two polarizing evils,
rebellion of the governed and tyranny of those who govern, con-
servation appearing as the guiding principle of the middle term
alternative to them26. Stability and the maintenance of a bal-
anced status quo generally suit better with “the practice of char-
ity and justice” than alternatives to them except when the status
quo negates that very practice27. Thus, conservation befits both
forms of government, monarchic or republican. Change involves
undesirable consequences that Spinoza admirably portrays. The
subversion of institutions and of what custom consecrates becomes
a danger to be averted28.
In order to demonstrate this point of view (according to which
preserving the form of the state is preferable to its forced and vol-
untary alteration) Spinoza collects examples of religious and polit-
ical about-turns from the history of England in the 17th Century
(just like Montaigne illustrated an analogous argumentation with
23Cf. SI 199; G 192.
24Cf. SI 200; G 194.
25Cf. SI 204; G 197.
26Cf. SI 220 ﬀ; G 212 ﬀ.
27Cf. SI 234; G 226.
28Reading some passages of the TTP we have often the impression of read-
ing a text by Hume or by Burke avant la lettre.
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examples gleaned from the history of England in the previous cen-
tury) which at the end have only the eﬀect of definitely what time
had slowly established for the sake of warmongering and serving
uncontrolled passions and private interests:
“This is why a people have often been able to change tyrants but
are never able to get rid of them or change the monarchical form
into another form of state. The English people have provided a fatal
example of this truth. They looked for reasons that would seem to
justify their deposing their monarch. But once they had deposed him,
they could do no less than change their form of state. However, after
spilling a great deal of blood, they succeeded merely in installing
a new monarch with a diﬀerent title [. . . ] By the time the people
realized that they had done nothing for the safety of their country
except violate the right of a legitimate king and change everything for
worse, it was too late. Consequently, as soon as they had the chance,
they decided to retrace their steps, and did not rest until they saw
everything restored to its former state”.29
It greatly honours Spinoza’s rationalism that it subtly and au-
daciously perfects itself by not rejecting incorporating rational ex-
planations of what normally disclaims any kind of political ra-
tionalism. Thus the Dutch philosopher takes into consideration
historical events such as those he called a “fatal example”.
When Spinoza analyzes the disrupting eﬀects of revolution-
ary changes, of the political excesses of submission to religious
imperatives and of the violence inherent to brusque alterations re-
curring to examples of Biblical and Classical History, as well as of
29SI 235-236; G 227: “Hinc igitur factum, ut populus saepe quidem tyran-
num mutare, at nunquam tollere, nec imperium monarchicum in aliud alterius
formae mutare potuerit. Hujus rei fatale exemplum populus Anglicanus dedit,
qui causas quaesivit, quibus specie juris monarcham e medio tolleret ; at, eo
sublato, nihil minus facere potuit, quam formam imperii mutare, sed post mul-
tum sanguinem eﬀusum huc perventum est, ut novus monarcha alio nomine
salutaretur (quasi tota quaestio de solo nomine fuisset), qui nulla ratione per-
sistere poterat, nisi stirpem regiam penitus delendo, regis amicos vel amicitiâ
suspectos necando, et otium pacis rumoribus aptum, bello disturbando, ut
plebs novis rebus occupata, et intenta cogitationes de caede regia alio divert-
eret. Sero igitur animadvertit populus se pro salute patriae nihil aliud secisse,
quam jus legitimi regis violare, resque omnes in pejorem statum mutare. Ergo
gradum, ubi licuit, revocare decrevit, nec quievit, donec omnia in pristinum
suum statum restaurata vidit”.
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more recent times, never failing to show them as matter to be duly
mused upon bearing lessons to be taken as to the conduct to adopt
in the 17th Century Dutch Republic. His apology of stability is
as eloquent as this analysis. In the conclusion of chapter XVIII,
Spinoza insists on the defence of political conservation: “[. . . ] the
form of each state must necessarily be retained and cannot be
changed without risking the total ruin of the state”. 30
Whereas we do not defend an interpretation that claims
Spinoza’s philosophy could be considered conservative, we insist
that in the TTP the notion of conservation plays a crucial role,
being upheld in particularly important chapters. Zourabichvili, as
we have said in the beginning of the article, highlighted aspect re-
lated to the theme of conservation and the problems it involves in
Spinoza’s philosophy. Though his fascinating reading (the many
merits of which are not confined to having tackled those prob-
lems) goes too far for classifying Spinoza’s philosophy as a sort
of conservatism, he does not go far enough because he tends to
underplay the concern of the Dutch philosopher with conservation
as necessarily resulting in a paradoxical attitude the core of which
consists in a set of contradictions:
“It [Spinoza’s philosophy] never fails [. . . ] to address the problem of
transformation, of its reality, its phantasm and the related borderlines
[. . . ]. There are three ways of escaping what Spinoza’s philosophy
here impels us to think: the first is to interpret it as a conservatism
(inclusively a political one), the second resides in interpreting as a
transformism (inclusively a political one), and the third consists of
interpreting this antithesis – which only two misrepresentations help
to form – as a contradiction that can be attributed to the thinker”.
31
After all, Zourabichvili seems here more interested in empha-
sizing the paradoxical dimension of Spinoza’s thinking than fo-
cused on its aspects related to his reflection on conservation, mainly
the political dimension.
30SI 237; G 228: “[. . . ] uniuscujusque imperii forma necessario retinenda
est, nec absque periculo totalis ipsius ruinae mutari potest”.
31F. Zourabichvili, Op. Cit., p. 31 (my translation).
294 Rui Bertrand Romão
In this article, exclusively centred (mainly for methodological
reasons) on the TTP32, I only tried to pinpoint Spinoza’s enor-
mous concern with conservation shown throughout its text. The
passages I have highlighted, as well as some others in the same
vein, do not allow us to characterize his thinking as conservative
or as transformist. We cannot also classify it as simply paradoxi-
cal. Notwithstanding its ambiguities and contradictions, the TTP
reveals itself as an extremely cogent work, especially when it deals
with some issues and questions. One of the foremost among them
is precisely the one that consists of his meditations on conservation
related themes and motives.
32I leave for a later occasion a more thorough study of the idea of conser-
vation in Spinoza that will also take into account the Ethics as well as the
Political Treatise and other writings of his.
